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Abstract
The problem of optimum watermark embedding and detection was addressed in a recent paper by Merhav and
Sabbag, where the optimality criterion was the maximum false–negative error exponent subject to a guaranteed false–
positive error exponent. In particular, Merhav and Sabbag derived universal asymptotically optimum embedding and
detection rules under the assumption that the detector relies solely on second order joint empirical statistics of the
received signal and the watermark. In the case of a Gaussian host signal and a Gaussian attack, however, closed–form
expressions for the optimum embedding strategy and the false–negative error exponent were not obtained in that work.
In this paper, we derive such expressions, again, under the universality assumption that neither the host variance nor
the attack power are known to either the embedder or the detector. The optimum embedding rule turns out to be
very simple and with an intuitively–appealing geometrical interpretation. The improvement with respect to existing
sub–optimum schemes is demonstrated by displaying the optimum false–negative error exponent as a function of the
guaranteed false–positive error exponent.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
About a decade ago, the community of researchers in the field of watermarking and data hiding has learned about
the importance and relevance of the problem of channel coding with non–causal side information at the transmitter
[1], and in particular, its Gaussian version – writing on dirty paper, due to Costa [2], along with its direct applicability
to watermarking, cf. [3], [4]. Costa’s main result is that the capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel with an additional independent interfering signal, known non–causally to the transmitter only, is the same
as if this interference was available at the decoder as well (or altogether non–existent). When applied in the realm
of watermarking and data hiding, this means that the host signal (playing the role of the interfering signal), should
not be actually considered as additional noise, since the embedder (the transmitter) can incorporate its knowledge
upon generating the watermarked signal (the codeword). The methods based on this paradigm, usually known as
side-informed methods, can even asymptotically eliminate (under some particular conditions) the interference of the
host signal, that was previously believed to be inherent to any watermarking system.
Ever since the relevance of Costa’s result to watermarking has been observed, numerous works have been
published about the practical implementation of the side–informed paradigm for the so-called multi–bit watermarking
[4], [5], [6], [7] case, where the decoder estimates the transmitted message among many possible messages. Far less
attention has been devoted, however, to the problem of deciding on the presence or absence of a given watermark
in the observed signal. In fact, in most of the works that deal with this binary hypothesis testing problem, usually
known as one–bit (a.k.a. zero–bit) watermarking, the watermarking displacement signal does not depend on the
the host [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] that then interferes with the watermark, thus contributing to augment the error
probability. To the best of our knowledge, exceptions to this statement are the works by Cox et al. [3], [13], Liu
and Moulin [14], Merhav and Sabbag [15] and Furon [16]. In the next few paragraphs, we briefly describe the main
results contained in these works.
Cox et. al. [3], [13]: In [3], Cox et. al. introduce the paradigm of watermarking as a coded communication system
with side information at the embedder. Based on this paradigm, and by considering a statistical model for attacks,
the authors propose a detection rule based on the Neyman–Pearson criterion. The resulting detection region is
replaced by the union of two hypercones; mathematically, this detection rule is given by |s
t·u|
‖s‖·‖u‖ ≥ τ(α), where
s is the received signal, u is the watermark, st is the transpose of s, st · u is the inner product of s and u, α is
the maximum allowed false–positive probability, and τ(α) is the decision threshold, which is a function of α. In a
successive paper [13], Miller et al. also compare the performance of the strategy of [3] to other typical embedding
strategies. No attempt is made to jointly design the optimum embedding and detection rules.
Liu and Moulin [14]: In [14], both false–positive and false–negative error exponents are studied for the one–bit
watermarking problem, both for additive spread spectrum (Add-SS) and a quantization index modulation (QIM)
technique [4]. The constraint on the embedding distortion is expressed in terms of the mean Euclidean norm of the
watermarking displacement signal, and the non–watermarked signal is also assumed to be attacked (with attacks
that impact the false–positive error probability). For Add-SS, exact expressions of the error exponents of both
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3false–positive and false–negative probabilities are derived. For QIM, the authors provide bounds only. These results
show that although the error exponents of QIM are indeed larger than those obtained by public Add-SS (where the
host signal is not available at the detector), they are still smaller than those computed for private Add-SS (where
the host signal is also available at the detector). This seems to indicate that the interference due to the host is not
completely removed.
Merhav and Sabbag [15]: In [15], the problem of one–bit watermarking is approached from an information–
theoretic point of view. Optimum embedders and detectors are sought, in the sense of minimum false–negative
probability subject to the constraint that the false–positive exponent is guaranteed to be at least as large as a
given prescribed constant λ > 0, under a certain limitation on the kind of empirical statistics gathered by the
detector. Another feature of the analysis in [15] is that the statistics of the host signal are assumed unknown. The
proposed asymptotically optimum detection rule compares the empirical mutual information between the watermark
u and the received signal y to a threshold depending on λ. In the Gaussian case, this boils down to thresholding the
absolute value of the empirical correlation coefficient between these two signals. Merhav and Sabbag also derive the
optimal embedding strategy for the attack–free case and derive a lower bound on the false–negative error exponent.
Furthermore, the optimization problem associated with uptimum embedding is reduced to an easily implementable
2D problem yielding a very simple embedding rule. In that paper, Merhav and Sabbag study also the scenario
where the watermarked signal is attacked. In this case, however, closed–form expressions for the error exponents
and the optimum embedding rule are not available due to the complexity of the involved optimizations.
Furon [16]: In [16], Furon uses the Pitman–Noether theorem [17] to derive the form of the best detector for a given
embedding function, and the best embedding function for a given detection function. By combining these results,
a differential equation is obtained, that the author refers to as the fundamental equation of zero-bit watermarking.
Furon shows that many of the most popular watermarking methods in the literature can be seen as special cases
of the fundamental equation, ranging from Add-SS, multiplicative spread spectrum, or JANIS [18], to a two-sheet
hyperboloid, or even combinations of the previous techniques with watermarking on a projected domain [19],
or watermarking based on lattice quantization. Compared with the framework introduced in [15], two important
differences must be highlighted:
• In [16], the watermarking displacement signal is constrained to be a function of the host signal which is
scaled to yield a given embedding distortion. This means that in this set–up the direction of the watermarking
displacement signal can not be changed as a function of the allowed embedding distortion.
• One of the conditions that must be verified in order to apply the Pitman–Noether theorem is that the power of
the watermarking displacement signal goes to zero when the dimensionality increases without bound. In fact,
Furon hypothesizes that this is the reason why neither the absolute normalized correlation nor the normalized
correlation are solutions of the fundamental equation.
In this paper, we extend the results of [15] and derive a closed–form expression for the optimum embedding
and detection strategies in the Gaussian set–up, that is, for a Gaussian host signal and a Gaussian attack channel.
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4As in [15], we assume that the embedder and the detector do not know the variance of the host signal and that of
the noise added by the attacker. We also share with [15] the assumption that the detector is of limited resources,
specifically, that it relies only on the Euclidean norm of the received signal and the empirical correlation between the
received signal and the watermark. We derive explicit embedding and detection rules and establish their asymptotic
optimality in the Neyman–Pearson sense of maximizing the false–negative error exponent for a given guaranteed
false–positive error exponent. We also derive a closed–form expression for the false–negative error exponent. The
optimum embedding strategy turns out to be very simple, and this opens the door to the development of new practical
watermarking schemes for real–life signals like images, video or audio signals. The improved performance of the
new scheme is demonstrated both theoretically, by comparing the achieved error exponents and those achieved by
previous methods, and numerically, by displaying graphs of the error exponent functions.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce notation conventions and
formalize the problem. In Section III, an asymptotically optimum detection region is derived. In Section IV, we
use it to compute the false–negative error exponent, whose optimization is considered in Section V to derive
a corresponding optimum embedder. In Section VI, the optimum embedder and the exact false–negative error
exponent for the noiseless case are introduced as a by–product of this analysis and compared to previous results
in the literature. Finally, the main results of this work are summarized in Section VII where some suggestions for
future research are also outlined.
II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Throughout the sequel, we denote scalar random variables by capital letters (e.g., V ), their realizations with
corresponding lower case letters (e.g., v), and their alphabets, with the respective script font (e.g., V). The same
convention applies to n–dimensional random vectors and their realizations, using bold face fonts (e.g., V, v). The
alphabet of each corresponding n–vector will be taken to be the n–th Cartesian power of the alphabet of a single
component, which will be denoted by the alphabet of a single component with a superscript n (e.g.,Vn). The i-th
component of a vector V is denoted Vi. The probability law of a random vector V is described by its probability
density function (pdf) fV(v), or its probability mass function (pmf) PV(V = v), depending on whether it is
continuous or discrete, respectively.
Let u and x, both n−dimensional vectors, be the watermark sequence and the host sequence, respectively. While
ui, i = 1, . . . , n, the components of u, take on binary values in U = {−1,+1},1 the components of x, namely, xi,
i = 1, . . . , n, take values in X = IR. The embedder receives x and u, and produces the watermarked sequence y,
yet another n–dimensional vector with components in Y = IR. We refer to the difference signal w = y− x as the
watermarking displacement signal. The embedder must keep the embedding distortion d(x,y) = ‖y− x‖2 within
a prescribed limit, i.e., d(x,y) ≤ nD, where D > 0 is the maximum allowed distortion per dimension, uniformly
for every x and u.
1The basic derivations of this work will remain valid for different choices of U .
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5The output signal of the transmitter may either be the unaltered original host x, in the non–watermarked case,
or the vector y, in the watermarked case. In both cases, this output signal is subjected to an attack, which yields
a forgery signal, denoted by s. The action of the attacker is modeled by a channel, which is given in terms of a
conditional probability density of the forgery given the input it receives, W (s|x) – in the non–watermarked case,
or W (s|y) – in the watermarked case. For the sake of convenience, we define z as the noise vector added by
the attacker, i.e., the difference between the forgery signal s and the channel input signal, which is the transmitter
output (x or y, depending on whether the signal is watermarked or not). We assume that z is a Gaussian vector
with zero–mean, i.i.d. components, all having variance σ2Z .
The detector partitions IRn into two complementary regions, Λ (a.k.a. the detection region) and Λc. If s ∈ Λ,
the detector decides that the watermark is present, otherwise it decides that the watermark is absent. We assume
that the detector knows the watermark u, but does not know the host signal x (blind or public watermarking). The
design of the optimum detection region for the attack–free case was studied in [15], and it is generalized to the
case of Gaussian attacks in Section III.
The performance of a one–bit watermarking system is usually measured in terms of the tradeoff between the
false positive probability of deciding that the watermark is present when it is actually absent, i.e.,
Pfp =
∫
Λ
ds · [2pi(σ2X + σ2Z)]−n/2 · exp
{
− ‖s‖
2
2(σ2X + σ
2
Z)
}
(1)
and the false negative probability, of deciding that the watermark is absent when it is actually present, i.e.,
Pfn =
∫
Λc
ds
∫
IRn
dx · (2piσ2X)−n/2 · exp
{
−‖x‖
2
2σ2X
}
· (2piσ2Z)−n/2 · exp
{
−‖s− f(x,u)‖
2
2σ2Z
}
, (2)
where f is the embedding function, that is, y = f(x,u). As n grows without bound, these probabilities normally
decay exponentially. The corresponding exponential decay rates, i.e., the error exponents, are defined as
Efp , lim
n→∞
− 1
n
lnPfp, (3)
Efn , lim
n→∞
− 1
n
lnPfn. (4)
The aim of this paper is to devise a detector as well as an embedding rule for a zero–mean, i.i.d. Gaussian host
with variance σ2X and a zero–mean memoryless Gaussian attack channel with noise power σ2Z , where the detector is
limited to base its decision on the empirical energy of the received signal and its empirical correlation with u. Both
σ2X and σ2Z are assumed unknown to the embedder and the detector. We seek optimum embedding and detection
rules in the sense of uniformly maximizing the false–negative error exponent, Efn, (across all possible values of
σ2X and σ2Z) subject to the constraint that Efp ≥ λ, where λ is a prescribed positive real.
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6III. OPTIMUM DETECTION AND EMBEDDING
In [15], an asymptotically optimum detector is derived for the discrete case and for the continuous Gaussian
case. In the latter case, it is shown that if the detector is limited to base its decision on the empirical energy of the
received signal, 1n
∑n
i=1 s
2
i , and its empirical correlation with the watermark, 1n
∑n
i=1 uisi, then an asymptotically
optimum decision strategy, in the above defined sense, is to compare the (Gaussian) empirical mutual information,
given by:
Iˆus(U ;S) = −1
2
ln
[
1−
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 uisi
)2(
1
n
∑n
i=1 u
2
i
) (
1
n
∑n
i=1 s
2
i
)
]
= −1
2
ln
[
1−
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 uisi
)2
1
n
∑n
i=1 s
2
i
]
(5)
to λ, or equivalently, to compare the absolute normalized correlation
|ρˆus| =
∣∣ 1
n
∑n
i=1 uisi
∣∣√
1
n
∑n
i=1 s
2
i
, (6)
to
√
1− e−2λ, i.e., the detection region is the union of two hypercones, around the vectors u and −u, with a spread
depending on λ. This decision rule of thresholding the empirical mutual information, or empirical correlation, is
intuitively appealing since the empirical mutual information is an estimate of the degree of statistical dependence
between two data vectors.2
For the present setting, we have to extend the analysis to incorporate the Gaussian attack channel. But this turns
out to be staightforward, as in the non–watermarked case (pertaining to the false–positive constraint), s continues
to be Gaussian – the only effect of the channel is in changing its variance, which is assumed unknown anyhow.
Thus, the same detection rule as above continues to be asymptotically optimum in our setting as well.
Before we proceed to the derivation of the optimum embedder, it is instructive to look more closely at the
dependence of the detection region on the false–positive exponent λ. As mentioned earlier, the choice of λ imposes
a threshold that must be compared with (6) in order to provide the detector output. This is equivalent to establishing
the limit angle of the detection region, that we will denote by β = arccos(
√
1− e−2λ) = arcsin(e−λ) ∈ [0, pi/2].
Letting θ = arccos(ρˆus), we then have:
Pfp = Pr{ρˆ2us > 1− e−2λ|H0}
= Pr{0 ≤ θ < β|H0}+ Pr{pi − β < θ ≤ pi|H0}
= 2Pr{0 ≤ θ < β|H0} = 2An(β)
An(pi)
.
= en ln(sin β), (7)
where the notation .= stands for equality in the exponential scale as a function of n,3 and where An(θ) is the
surface area of the n–dimensional spherical cap cut from a unit sphere centered in the origin, by a right circular
cone of half angle θ. In (7), we used the fact that in the non–watermarked case, where s is a zero–mean Gaussian
2It is also encountered in the literature of universal decoding the maximum mutual information (MMI) decoder for unknown memoryless
channels.
3 More precisely, if {an} and {bn} are two positive sequences, an ·= bn means that limn→∞ 1n log
an
bn
= 0.
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7vector with i.i.d. components, independent of u, the normalized vector s/‖s‖ is uniformly distributed across the
surface of the n–dimensional unit sphere, as there are no preferred directions. The exact expression of An(θ) is
given by:
An(θ) =
(n− 1)pi(n−1)/2
Γ
(
n+1
2
) θ∫
0
sin(n−2)(ϕ)dϕ.
IV. THE FALSE–NEGATIVE EXPONENT
In this section, we make the first step towards the derivation of the optimum embedding strategy. In particular,
we compute the false–negative error exponent as a function of the watermarking displacement signal w, which is
represented by a three–dimensional vector v = (v1, v2, v3). The vector v is the vector w, normalized by
√
n, and
transformed to the coordinate system pertaining to the linear subspace spanned by u, x and w. This result will be
used later to derive the optimal embedding function subject to the distortion constraint, that limits the norm of w
not to exceed nD, which corresponds to the constraint v21 + v22 + v23 ≤ D. To this end, we establish the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: Let Pfp, Pfn and their corresponding error exponents Efp and Efn, be defined as in eqs. (1),(2),(3)
and (4), respectively. Let v = (v1, v2, v3) ∈ IR3 be given, and let Λ = {s : ρˆ2us ≥ 1− e−2λ}. Then,
Efn = min
q∈[max(0,T1(r,α,v)),∞)
min
r∈[0,∞)
min
α∈[−pi/2,pi/2]
{
1
2
[
q
σ2Z
− ln
(
q
σ2Z
)
− 1
]
+
1
2
[
r
σ2X
− ln
(
r
σ2X
)
− 1
]
− ln(cosα)
}
, (8)
where
T1(r, α,v) , (
√
r sinα+ v1)
2
(
1
cos2 β
− 1
)
− (√r cosα+ v2)2 − v23 .
Proof. For convenience, let us apply the Gram–Schmidt orthogonalization procedure to the vectors u, x and w,
and then select the remaining n− 3 orthonormal basis functions for IRn in an arbitrary manner. After transforming
to the resulting coordinate system, the above vectors have the forms u = (
√
n, 0, 0, . . . , 0), x = (x1, x2, 0, . . . , 0),
w = (w1, w2, w3, 0, . . . , 0) and y = (x1+w1, x2+w2, w3, 0, . . . , 0), while all the components of the noise sequence
z will remain, in general, non–null. From (6), the false–negative event occurs whenever
(x1 + w1 + z1)
2
(x1 + w1 + z1)2 + (x2 + w2 + z2)2 + (w3 + z3)2 +
∑n
j=4 z
2
j
< cos2 β,
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8where w21 + w22 + w23 ≤ nD, x21 = nr sin2 α and x22 = nr cos2 α, with r being given by r , ||x||
2
n , and
α , arcsin
(
<x,u>
||x||·||u||
)
. Equivalently, the false negative event can be rewritten as:
(x1 +
√
nv1 + z1)
2
(
1
cos2(β)
− 1
)
− (x2 +
√
nv2 + z2)
2 − (√nv3 + z3)2
= (
√
nr sin(α) +
√
nv1 + z1)
2
(
1
cos2(β)
− 1
)
− [√nr cos(α) +√nv2 + z2]2 − (√nv3 + z3)2 < n∑
j=4
z2j = (n− 3)q,
where q , 1n−3
∑n
j=4 z
2
j . By defining
T1 , (
√
r sinα+ v1)
2
(
1
cos2 β
− 1
)
− (√r cosα+ v2)2 − v23 , (9)
and
T2 , −[z21 + 2z1(
√
nr sinα+
√
nv1)]
(
1
cos2 β
− 1
)
+ z22
+ 2z2
[√
nr cosα+
√
nv2
]
+ z23 + 2
√
nv3z3,
the presentation of the false negative event can be further modified to
nT1 < (n− 3)q + T2,
or equivalently
q >
nT1
n− 3 −
T2
n− 3 .
Next, observe that (n−3)q
σ2
Z
is a χ2 random variable with n− 3 degrees of freedom, i.e.,
fQ(q) =


n−3
σ2
Z
(
1
2
)(n−3)/2 1
Γ(n−32 )
(
(n−3)q
σ2
Z
)(n−32 −1)
e
−
(n−3)q
2σ2
Z , if q ≥ 0
0, elsewhere
. (10)
By the same token, R = ||X||
2
n , is also a χ
2 distribution, this time, with n degrees of freedom, and so its density
is given by
fR(r) =


n
σ2
X
(
1
2
)n/2 1
Γ(n2 )
(
nr
σ2
X
)(n2−1)
e
− nr
2σ2
X , if r ≥ 0
0, elsewhere
. (11)
Defining Ψ = arcsin(< X,u > /‖X‖), we have (in the absence of a watemark):
P (Ψ ≤ α) = 1− An(pi/2− α)
2An(pi/2)
,
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9from which it follows that the pdf of Ψ is
fΨ(α) =
∂P (Ψ ≤ α)
∂α
=
2Γ
(
n
2
)
√
piΓ
(
n−1
2
) cosn−2 α.
and so
Pfn =
pi/2∫
α=−pi/2
+∞∫
r=0
+∞∫
z3=−∞
+∞∫
z2=−∞
+∞∫
z1=−∞
+∞∫
q=max(0,
nT1
n−3−
T2
n−3 )
n− 3
σ2Z
(
1
2
)(n−3)/2
1
Γ
(
n−3
2
) ( (n− 3)q
σ2Z
)(n−32 −1)
e
− (n−3)q
2σ2
Z
e
−
z21
2σ2
Z√
2piσ2Z
e
−
z22
2σ2
Z√
2piσ2Z
e
−
z23
2σ2
Z√
2piσ2Z
n
σ2X
(
1
2
)n/2
1
Γ
(
n
2
) ( nr
σ2X
)(n2−1)
e
− nr
2σ2
X
2Γ
(
n
2
)
√
piΓ
(
n−1
2
) cosn−2 α · dqdz1dz2dz3drdα.
Using the facts that limn→∞ nT1n−3 − T2n−3 = T1 and that T2 grows sublinearly with n, we get
lim
n→∞
− 1
n
lnPfn = −1
2
− 1
2
− lim
n→∞
1
n
ln
pi/2∫
α=−pi/2
+∞∫
r=0
+∞∫
z3=−∞
+∞∫
z2=−∞
+∞∫
z1=−∞
+∞∫
q=max(0,T1)
e
−
z21
2σ2
Z√
2piσ2Z
e
−
z22
2σ2
Z√
2piσ2Z
e
−
z23
2σ2
Z√
2piσ2Z
×
e
(n−32 −1) ln(
q
σ2
Z
)
e
− (n−3)q
2σ2
Z e
(n2−1) ln
r
σ2
X e
− nr
2σ2
X ×
e(n−2) ln(cosα)dqdz1dz2dz3drdα.
where we used the fact that
lim
n→∞
1
n
ln
[
(1/2)
n
2 n
n−2
2
Γ(n/2)
]
=
1
2
. (12)
Finally, by using the saddle–point method [20], the exponential rate of this multi–dimensional integral is dominated
by the point at which the integrand is maximum, and we obtain the result asserted in the theorem. This completes
the proof of Theorem 1.
V. THE OPTIMUM WATERMARKING DISPLACEMENT SIGNAL
Having derived Efn as a function of v, we are now ready to derive the main result of this paper, which is the
optimum embedding function, i.e., the one that maximizes Efn.
Theorem 2: The maximum false–negative exponent, Efn, subject to the constraint v21+v22+v23 ≤ D, is achieved
by v∗ = (v∗1 , v∗2 , v∗3) where:
v∗1 = ±
√
D − r cos4 β,
v∗2 = −
√
r cos2 β,
v∗3 = 0.
November 13, 2018 DRAFT
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Proof. Consider first the dependence of Efn on α. On the one hand, − ln(cosα) is minimized when α = 0. On the
other hand, T1 also depends on α. Since Efn is monotonically non–decreasing in T1 and the distortion is insensitive
to the sign of any component of the watermark, it is seen from eq. (9) that the signs v1 and v2 should be such that
v1 sinα ≥ 0, and v2 cosα ≤ 0. Therefore T1(r, α) is even in α, and its minimum is reached at α = 0. This means
that the minimum of (8) is obtained for α = 0, and then (8) can be rewritten as
lim
n→∞
− 1
n
lnPfn = min
(q,r)∈[max(0,T1(r)),∞)×[0,∞)
1
2
[
q
σ2Z
− ln
(
q
σ2Z
)
− 1
]
+
1
2
[
r
σ2X
− ln
(
r
σ2X
)
− 1
]
. (13)
As the objective function is convex in (r, q), and the global minimum is at (σ2X , σ2Z), the minimum in (13) would
vanish if (σ2Z , σ2X) ∈ [max(0, T1(r)),∞)× [0,∞). Otherwise, the minimum lies on the boundary, i.e., it is a point
of the form (T1(r), r), with r ≥ 0.
Consider next the optimization of (v1, v2, v3). Observe that the only influence of v on Efn is via T1. Thus, v
should be chosen so as to maximize T1. Given that α = 0, T1 can be written as
T1 = v
2
1
(
1
cos2 β
− 1
)
− (√r + v2)2 − v23 ,
which should be maximized over v subject to
v21 + v
2
2 + v
2
3 ≤ D.
Obviously any non–zero value of v3, both decreases T1 and reduces the distortion budget remaining for v1 and v2.
Thus, v∗3 = 0. Now, T1 is monotonically increasing in v21 , so the maximum must be achieved for v21 + v22 = D,
which enables to express T1 as4
T1 = v
2
1
(
1
cos2 β
− 1
)
−
[√
r −
√
D − v21
]2
.
Equating dT1/dv1 to zero and solving for v1, we obtain three solutions:

v1 = 0
v1 = −
√
D − r cos4 β
v1 =
√
D − r cos4 β
.
Considering the second derivative, it is easy to see that for v∗1 = ±
√
D − r cos4 β one obtains maxima of T1,
yielding v∗2 = −
√
r cos2 β, and a corresponding value of T1 = D tan2 β − r sin2 β.
4Note that two solutions are possible for v2, namely v2 = ±
q
D − v2
1
. Here we take the negative one, since, as we noted before, v2 and
cosα must have opposite signs and −pi/2 ≤ α ≤ pi/2, thus cosα is always positive.
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A. Discussion
First, observe that the watermarking displacement signal w, and therefore also the watermarked sequence y, lies
in the plane spanned by the watermark u and the host signal x (a similar conclusion was reached in [15] in the
attack–free case). This allows to express the optimum watermarking displacement signal, as well as the watermarked
sequence, as a combination of the host signal and the watermark, leading to the following result:
Corollary 1: The optimum watermarked signal is given by y = ax+ bu, where
a = 1− cos
2 β
cosα
,
b =
√
r · tanα cos2 β ±
√
D − r cos4 β.
Proof. From Theorem 2, we have:
y1 =
√
nr sinα±
√
n(D − r cos4 β) (14)
y2 =
√
nr[cosα− cos2 β].
On the other hand, y2 = a
√
nr cosα, and so, we can conclude that a = 1 − cos2 βcosα . To find b, we use y1 =
a
√
nr sinα+ b
√
n, which when combined with (14), gives the value of b is asserted in Corollary 1. This completes
the proof of Corollary 1.
It should also be pointed out that the optimum embedding strategy depends neither on σ2X nor on σ2Z , which is
the desirable required universality feature. As a consequence, the embedding strategy is the same for the attack–free
case, studied in detail in Section VI.
The geometrical interpretation of the embedding strategy is the following: the embedder devotes part of the allowed
distortion budget to scale down the host signal, thus reducing its interference, and then injects the remaining energy
in the direction of the watermark. In fact, this explains why only the component of the watermarked signal in the
direction of the watermark (i.e., b) depends on D. For illustration, we compare the optimum embedding and the sign-
embedder introduced in [15]. For the sign embedder, the watermarked signal is given by yse = x+sign(xt ·u)
√
Du,
so the watermarking displacement signal can be written as wse = sign(xt ·u)
√
Du. The two strategies are compared
in Fig. 1, where it is easy to see that the proposed strategy is that of minimizing the embedding distortion necessary
for obtaining a watermarked signal. It is also interesting to observe that the optimum embedding technique given
by Theorem 2, could not be described by [16], as in that case the watermarking displacement signal direction is
just a function of the host signal, and it is scaled for obtaining the desired distortion.
Another way to look at Theorem 2 is by evaluating a joint condition on the embedding distortion and the false–
positive exponent (or equivalently on β) that allows to obtain a false–negative error exponents: if T1 ≤ 0, then the
optimization in (13) is performed on the region [0,∞) × [0,∞), so any pair (σ2Z , σ2X), even with σ2Z = 0, will
be in the allowed region, yielding a vanishing error exponent. The condition that permits to avoid this situation is
r ≤ Dcos2 β . We can reach the same result by considering the case α = 0, which is the case that captures most of
November 13, 2018 DRAFT
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yminsey
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u
Fig. 1. Geometrical interpretation of the optimum embedding problem, and comparison between the sign-embedder and the optimum embedder.
w
min
opt and wminse denote the minimum norm watermarking displacement signals that produce signals in the detection region, for both the optimal
embedder and the sign embedder, respectively. The corresponding watermarked signals are yminopt and yminse . Furthermore, one can see the
watermarked signals for the optimal embedder and the sign embedder when part of the embedding distortion can be used to gain some robustness
to noise (denoted by yrobopt and yrobse ).
probability. In this case, the two components of the watermarked signal y are given by
y1 = ±
√
n(D − r cos4 β),
y2 =
√
nr(1− cos2 β),
or equivalently a = 1 − cos2 β and b = ±
√
D − r cos4 β. Therefore, when D = r cos2 β the watermarked signal
is the intersection of the boundary of the detection region and the perpendicular vector to that boundary that goes
through x. On the other hand, when D < r cos2 β, even in the noiseless case, one cannot ensure that the embedding
distortion constraint allows to produce a signal in the detection region, so the embedding function in that case will
not be so important. In fact, regardless of the embedding function we choose, the false negative error exponent
would vanish.
B. False Negative Exponent of the Optimum Embedder
Having solved the optimum embedding problem, we can compute the false–negative exponent achieved by the
optimum embedder and compare it to previous results in the literature. To do so, the optimization in (13) is performed
over points of the form (T1(r), r) = (D tan2 β − r sin2 β, r), with 0 ≤ r ≤ Dcos2 β . The derivative of (13) with
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respect to r takes the value
1
2
(
−1
r
+
1
σ2X
+
cos2 β
D − r cos2 β −
sin2 β
σ2Z
)
,
which is piecewise convex in (0, D/ cos2 β), and (D/ cos2 β,∞). Due to the constraints introduced previously, we
are interested in the minimum in the interval (0, D/ cos2 β), which is achieved when
r∗ =
(
Dσ2Z + 2σ
2
Zσ
2
X cos
2 β −Dσ2X sin2 β
−
√
D2σ4Z + 4σ
4
Zσ
4
X cos
4 β − 2D2σ2Zσ2X sin2 β +D2σ4X sin4 β
)
×
[
2(σ2Z cos
2 β − σ2X cos2 β sin2 β)
]−1
. (15)
By replacing r with r∗ in the definition of T1(r) we get the value of q∗, then we insert r∗ and q∗ in (13), and
finally obtain the optimum error exponent for the AWGN case:
q∗ =
[(
2Dσ2Z +
√
16σ4Zσ
4
X cos
4 β +D2 [2σ2Z − σ2X(1 − cos(2β))]2
)
tan2 β
− 2σ2X sin2 β
(
2σ2Z +D tan
2 β
) ] [
4
(
σ2Z − σ2X sin2 β
)]−1
, (16)
E∗fn =
1
2
[
q∗
σ2Z
− ln
(
q∗
σ2Z
)
− 1
]
+
1
2
[
r∗
σ2X
− ln
(
r∗
σ2X
)
− 1
]
. (17)
Note that due to the choice of U and the symmetry of the Gaussian distribution followed by the host around zero,
the false-negative error exponent does not depend on the particular choice of the watermark u.
In Figs. 2, 3 and 4 the behavior of E∗fn is depicted as a function of various parameters. As expected, the false–
negative exponent decreases when the false–positive exponent λ, the attack variance σ2Z , or the host variance σ2X ,
increase, while it increases with D.
C. Numerical Results
In order to validate the theoretical results with numerical ones, we compare the false–negative exponent with the
empirical values of − 1n lnPfn, for large n. Although large values of n and − 1n log(Pfn) can not be considered
simultaneously, due to the resulting very small probability of false negative, in Fig. 5 we can see the similarity
between E∗fn and its empirical approximation when n increases, for different values of σ2Z . Furthermore, in Fig. 6
we compare the empirical approximation of the false–negative exponent to its theoretical value for the attack–free
case (special attention will be paid to this particular case in Section VI), for different values of λ. As expected, the
larger is λ, the smaller is the false–negative exponent.
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Fig. 2. False negative error exponent as a function of λ, for several powers of AWGN. σ2X = 1 and D = 2.
VI. THE ATTACK–FREE CASE
As a special case of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we calculate the false–negative exponent for the noiseless case
(σ2Z = 0). By computing the limit of σ2Z → 0 in (15), it is easy to see that in the attack–free case, we have:
lim
σ2
Z
→0
r∗ =
−2Dσ2X sin2 β
−2σ2X cos2 β sin2 β
=
D
cos2 β
=
D
1− e−2λ . (18)
To compute limσ2
Z
→0
q∗
σ2
Z
from (16) we can use L’Hoˆpital’s rule. Given that
lim
σ2
Z
→0
∂
∂σ2Z
[(
2Dσ2Z +
√
16σ4Zσ
4
X cos
4 β +D2 [2σ2Z − σ2X(1− cos(2β))]2
)
tan2 β
−2σ2X sin2 β
(
2σ2Z +D tan
2 β
) ]
= −4σ2X sin2 β,
and
lim
σ2
Z
→0
∂
∂σ2Z
σ2Z
[
4
(
σ2Z − σ2X sin2 β
)]
= −4σ2X sin2 β,
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Fig. 3. False negative error exponent as a function of σZ , for several embedding distortions. σ2X = 1 and λ = 0.1.
we conclude that
lim
σ2
Z
→0
q∗
σ2Z
= 1. (19)
From (18) and (19), it is straightforward to see that the value of the false–negative exponent for the attack–free
case is given by
lim
σ2
Z
→0
E∗fn =

 0, if
D
1−e−2λ ≤ σ2X
1
2
[
D
σ2
X
(1−e−2λ)
− ln
(
D
σ2
X
(1−e−2λ)
)
− 1
]
elsewhere
. (20)
In view of (20), it is interesting to note that as long as D > σ2X , E∗fn > 0 for any λ. In fact, under these conditions,
the asymptotic value of Efn when λ→∞ is
1
2
[
D
σ2X
− ln
(
D
σ2X
)
− 1
]
, (21)
coinciding with the result of [2. Corollary 1].
On the other hand, when D ≤ σ2X another interesting point which reflects the goodness of the proposed strategy
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Fig. 4. False negative error exponent as a function of σX , for several embedding distortions. σ2Z = 1 and λ = 0.1.
is the computation of the range of values of λ where Efn > 0 can be achieved. In this case, the condition to be
verified is
D
1− e−2λ > σ
2
X , (22)
implying that
λ < −1
2
ln
(
1− D
σ2X
)
= λ1, for D ≤ σ2X , (23)
whereas for the sign embedder [15], the values of λ for which Efn > 0 are those such that
D
σ2X
>
1− e−2λ
e−2λ
, (24)
or, equivalently,
λ < −1
2
ln
(
σ2X
D + σ2X
)
= λ2, for all D. (25)
Given that λ1 > λ2, larger values of false positive error exponents are allowed (while still keeping Efn > 0) by
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λ = 0.6, and σ2
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the new embedding rule. In Figure 7 we compare the bounds on the false–negative exponent for the attack–free
case found in [15], with its optimal value derived here. As can be seen, the improvement owing to the optimum
embedding strategy is significant, especially for small λ.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We derived a Neyman–Pearson asymptotically optimum one–bit watermarking scheme in the Gaussian setting,
when the detector is limited to base its decisions on second order empirical statistics only. The scenario we considered
is universal in the sense that the variance of both the host signal and the attack are not known to the embedder and
to the detector. Our main results are simple closed–form formulas for both the optimum embedding function and
the corresponding error exponents. The noiseless scenario can be seen as a special case, where we can compare
the false–negative exponent achieved by the optimum scheme with the bounds derived in [15]. Interestingly, the
optimum embedder is very simple thus opening the door to practical implementations.
This work can be extended in many interesting directions, including non-Gaussian settings, more complicated
attacks, like de-synchronization attacks [21], [22], more detailed empirical statistics gathred by the detector, and
the introduction of security considerations in the picture [23].
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